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1  | INTRODUC TION
Bangladesh has reported 556 outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian 
influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus in poultry and wild birds since 2007.1 
Sporadic human infections with avian influenza A viruses (AIVs), 
including eight patients with A(H5N1) virus infection and one fatal 
outcome, were reported.2 A study conducted between May 2012 
and December 2015 across Bangladesh reported high sero-prev-
alence of A(H5N1) virus antibodies among house crows (Corvus 
splendens) feeding on offal from live bird markets (LBMs).3 In 2011 
and 2016, A(H5N1) virus spread among house crows in several dis-
tricts of Bangladesh, including the capital, Dhaka.4,5 Crow mortality 
from HPAI A(H5N1) viruses was also reported in Japan and India.6,7 
Crow deaths were investigated previously in Dhaka,4 whereas this 
 
Received: 9 July 2019  |  Revised: 18 December 2019  |  Accepted: 20 December 2019
DOI: 10.1111/irv.12716  
S H O R T  A R T I C L E
Evaluation of potential risk of transmission of avian influenza 
A viruses at live bird markets in response to unusual crow die-
offs in Bangladesh
Mahbubur Rahman1,2  |   Punam Mangtani3 |   Timothy M. Uyeki4 |    
Jacqueline M. Cardwell1 |   Montserrat Torremorell5 |   Ariful Islam6 |    
Mohammed A. Samad7 |   A. K. M. Muraduzzaman2 |   Md Giasuddin7 |   Sudipta Sarkar2 |   
A. S. M. Alamgir2 |   M. Salimuzzaman2 |   Meerjady S. Flora2
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2020 The Authors. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The peer review history for this article is available at https ://publo ns.com/publo n/10.1111/irv.12716 
1Royal Veterinary College, Hatfield, UK
2Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control 
and Research, Dhaka, Bangladesh
3London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, London, UK
4Influenza Division, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, USA
5University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, MN, 
USA
6EcoHealth Alliance, New York, NY, USA
7Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute 
(BLRI), Savar, Bangladesh
Correspondence
Mahbubur Rahman, Institute of 
Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research 
(IEDCR), Dhaka, Bangladesh and Royal 
Veterinary College (RVC), Hatfield, UK.
Email: dr_mahbub@yahoo.com
Funding information
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences 
Research Council, Grant/Award Number: 
1681346
Abstract
In response to unusual crow die-offs from avian influenza A(H5N1) virus infection 
during January-February 2017 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, a One Health team assessed 
potential infection risks in live bird markets (LBMs). Evidence of aerosolized avian 
influenza A viruses was detected in LBMs and in the respiratory tracts of market 
workers, indicating exposure and potential for infection. This study highlighted the 
importance of surveillance platforms with a coordinated One Health strategy to in-
vestigate and mitigate zoonotic risk.
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investigation assessed possible sources of HPAI A(H5N1) virus and 
potential spillover risks to humans.
2  | INITIATION OF OUTBRE AK 
INVESTIGATION
In response to a report of unusual crow mortality around central 
Dhaka, on January 14, 2017,8 the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease 
Control and Research (IEDCR) initiated a multidisciplinary inves-
tigation from January 21 to February 12, 2017. The wildlife team 
identified 124 crow deaths within 7 km of the initial reported crow 
roosts.8 Crow samples tested positive for A(H5N1) virus by real-
time reverse transcription PCR (rRT-PCR).8 The hypothesis that 
crows might have acquired A(H5N1) virus infection after consuming 
infected dead poultry and/or their waste products3 was based on 
the observed crow die-offs near LBMs, where crows were observed 
feeding on poultry offal. To assess occupational risk of infection to 
exposed humans, we conducted a cross-sectional survey, examined 
air samples in LBMs, and collected respiratory samples from workers 
for influenza testing at 10 LBMs near the crow die-offs.
3  | METHODS
For markets with ≤20 workers, we recruited all employees; while in 
markets with >20 workers, we randomly selected 20 workers per 
market. We collected nasal and throat swabs, and information on 
illness symptoms and workers’ practices using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. In each market, air samples were also collected by a 
liquid cyclonic air sampler,9 together with market-level hygiene as-
sessments through observation. Based on a previous study, one air 
sampler was used for 30 minutes, placed in the center of each LBM, 
1.3 meters from the ground and approximately 0.5 m from poultry 
housing10 during 10:30 to 11:30 AM. At each LBM, the animal health 
team collected swabs from fresh fecal droppings beneath the poul-
try cages and accumulated offal samples; four samples from random 
sites were pooled together as one environmental sample per LBM. 
All samples were tested using rRT-PCR with appropriate positive and 
negative controls to exclude contamination. Nasal and throat swabs 
were tested for influenza A and B viruses with subtyping of M-gene-
positive influenza A viruses for seasonal H3, H1N1pdm09, and avian 
H5/H7/H9.11 Influenza A positive air and pooled environmental sam-
ples were subtyped for avian H5/H7/H9 only. Descriptive analysis 
was conducted using statistical software STATA (version 14.2).
4  | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Of the 10 markets, three had <8 poultry stalls, and the rest had 9-16 
stalls. The average number of workers per stall was 3.0 (SD 1.1). 
Almost all stalls slaughtered and defeathered birds. Multiple species 
of poultry were sold, including chickens, pigeon, geese, quail, and 
ducks at seven markets, and three LBMs only sold chickens. In all 
LBMs, birds not sold at the end of the day were kept in the same stall. 
No LBMs practiced market closure days or rest days without poultry.
All LBMs had visible poultry feces on the ground, but no dead 
birds. Six LBMs reported market cleaning more than once daily, 
but only one used disinfectant (eg, bleach). Three LBMs reported 
disposal of solid waste at least twice daily. Half of the markets had 
open drains. About 60% of stalls experienced poultry deaths in the 
week before the investigations, and some workers reported discard-
ing poultry carcasses as garbage or giving them to other workers. 
Temperature and relative humidity were not significantly different 
among LBMs during air sampling.
We enrolled 151 workers from 81 stalls, with mean age of 31.3 
(SD 11.8) years and median work experience of 9.0 years, interquar-
tile range (IQR) 4-16 years, and all except one were male. Nearly 
40% of the workers reported one or more of the following signs and 
symptoms in the previous 10 days: fever/feverishness (11.3%); mea-
sured temperature of ≥100.4°F (2.0%); cough (15.2%); sore throat 
(6.0%); runny nose (23.8%); eye redness (2.0%); diarrhea (0.7%); dif-
ficulty breathing (4.6%); headache or body ache (11.3%); and 60.9% 
were asymptomatic. Three workers reported febrile respiratory 
symptoms, and all three tested negative for influenza viruses by rRT-
PCR. Overall, 21 (13.9%) LBM workers had respiratory specimens 
that tested positive for influenza A (12.6% of nasal swabs, 4% of 
throat swabs), of whom 62% were asymptomatic and only four (19%) 
reported respiratory symptoms (runny nose and/or cough) without 
fever. Six LBMs had at least one worker who tested positive for in-
fluenza A virus. Most of the influenza A positive samples were either 
H9 or non-subtypeable (Table 1).
All 10 LBMs had pooled environmental specimens that tested 
positive for influenza A, including five H5, one with both H5 and 
H9, and four markets with non-subtypeable specimens. AIVs were 
detected by air sampling at nine of 10 LBMs, including four with H9, 
and five with co-detections of both H5 and H9 (Table 2). Culture 
of three M-gene-positive air samples in embryonated chicken eggs 
yielded viable virus isolates from three different LBMs, including one 
A(H5N1) and two A(H9N2) viruses. Sequencing of the HA gene of 
H5 positive air samples revealed a clade 2.3.2.1a virus that circulated 
since 20114 and was similar to the partial sequencing results from 
crow samples in the current outbreak.5
Our study had several limitations. First, we collected air and 
respiratory samples only from the identified 10 LBMs in proximity 
to the seven km area of the crow die-offs. Therefore, we could not 
ascertain whether detection of influenza A viruses was limited to 
these 10 LBMs or whether the high prevalence was because of the 
overall persistence and amplification of AIVs in LBMs and seasonal-
ity. Second, we were unable to confirm the sources of the viruses, 
whether crows were infected by contact with poultry at LBMs or 
whether they were responsible for spread of viruses among poultry 
or between LBMs, or other sources. However, Zhou et al isolated 
AIVs at LBMs in China10 and Bertran et al have demonstrated that 
experimental processing of HPAI A(H5N1) virus-infected chickens 
and ducks generated infectious droplets and aerosols.12,13 Overall, 
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LBMs were reported to be highly contaminated with AIVs by multiple 
studies in Bangladesh and other countries.14,15 Taken together, these 
studies suggest that the most likely source of the aerosolized AIVs 
in LBMs in Bangladesh is from slaughtering of infected poultry. The 
crows as carrion eaters were likely infected from the offal or wast-
age of infected poultry. Third, we did not evaluate workers’ practices 
for the occupational risk assessment because they had similar work 
practices as all participated in slaughtering and defeathering. Fourth, 
several influenza A positive respiratory samples were non-subtypea-
ble by RT-PCR. We hypothesized that (a) viral load was too low as 
most of the non-subtypeable specimens were collected from non-
ill workers that yielded high Ct values, or (b) the virus subtype was 
different from those that we tested for. Fifth, detection of AIV RNA 
in respiratory specimens of healthy LBM workers cannot distinguish 
asymptomatic infection from contamination. We believe it is more 
likely that such detection represents the latter, but additional studies 
are needed. For example, testing to detect viral replication in serial 
respiratory specimens and serological testing of paired sera to as-
sess seroconversion might provide evidence for infection. Sixth, viral 
culture was performed on three of nine M-gene-positive air samples, 
and although all three yielded AIVs, it is unknown if viral RNA detec-
tion in all of the positive air samples represented exposure to viable 
aerosolized viruses. Furthermore, since only partial sequencing of 
influenza A(H5) viral hemagglutinin was performed on H5 positive 
samples collected from air samples, we could only conclude that the 
clade 2.3.2.1a H5 viruses were similar to A(H5) viruses detected in 
crows but might not have been identical to clearly link the crows to 
infected poultry in LBMs.
5  | CONCLUSIONS
Overall, we found evidence of aerosolized AIVs in LBMs and respira-
tory specimens of LBM workers while investigating potential links 
between crow die-offs from HPAI A(H5N1) virus and poultry sold 
at LBMs. House crow die-offs appeared to be an indicator of the 
presence of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in poultry at LBMs and triggered 
the need for a multidisciplinary investigation to prevent or detect a 
potential AIV outbreak and assess the risk of exposure and spread 
to workers. These investigations also highlighted the importance of 
TA B L E  1   Comparison of rRT-PCR results of influenza A viral RNA detection for live bird market (LBM) air samples and workers’ 
respiratory (nasal and throat) specimens, Bangladesh, 2017a 
Air sample result
(n = number of LBMs 
tested)b 
No. of LBM 
workers 
tested
No of LBM 
workers with 
influenza 
A positive 
specimensc 
% (95% CI) of 
LBM workers 
with influenza 
A positive 
specimens
Influenza A virus subtype detected from human respiratory 
specimens
H5
n
H7
n
H9
n
Both H5 & H9
n
Non-
subtypeable
n
Influenza A(H5) and 
A(H9) (5)
71 12 16.9 (9.0-27.7) 1 0 5 1 5
Influenza A(H9) (4) 59 3 5.1 (1.1-14.2) 0 0 2 0 1
Negative (1) 21 6 28.6 (11.3-52.2) 0 0 3 1 2
Total (10) 151 21 13.9 (8.8-20.5) 1 0 10 2 8
arRT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription PCR; LBM, live bird market. 
brRT-PCR of samples was conducted in International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), Dhaka, Bangladesh; Culture of 
3 M-gene-positive air samples was conducted at the Bangladesh Livestock Research Institute (BLRI), Savar, Bangladesh. 
crRT-PCR of human respiratory samples was conducted at the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and Research, Dhaka, Bangladesh; The 
cutoff for Influenza A positivity in rRT-PCR assays was a cycle threshold (Ct) of ≤ 38; None of the nasal or throat swab specimens tested positive for 
seasonal influenza A(H1N1)pdm09, A(H3), or Influenza B viruses. 
TA B L E  2   Comparison between rRT-PCR results for influenza A viral RNA in environmental pooled samples and air samples at 10 LBMs, 
Bangladesh, 2017a 
Environmental sampleb 
Air sampleb 
Negative Influenza A(H5) Influenza A(H9)
Influenza A(H5) & 
A(H9) Total
Influenza A(H5) 1 0 2 2 5
Influenza A(H5) and A(H9) 0 0 0 1 1
Influenza A/non-subtypeable 0 0 2 2 4
Total 1 0 4 5 10
arRT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription PCR; LBM, live bird market. 
brRT-PCR of environmental and air samples were conducted in International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), Dhaka, 
Bangladesh; The cutoff for Influenza A positivity in rRT-PCR assays was a cycle threshold (Ct) of ≤ 38. 
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surveillance platforms (air, environmental, poultry, and human sam-
pling for influenza testing) with a coordinated One Health strategy 
to investigate zoonotic risk. While detection of AIV RNA in respira-
tory specimens of workers, especially asymptomatic persons, does 
not confirm infection, it provides evidence of exposure to AIVs and 
suggests potential for human infection. These findings indicate that 
improvements in market hygiene and biosecurity are needed in 
LBMs to reduce workers’ exposures to AIVs.
ACKNOWLEDG EMENTS
The authors thank the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control 
and Research (IEDCR) and the EcoHealth Alliance for their sup-
port in the outbreak investigation and permission to use data. We 
are grateful to the members of the outbreak investigation team 
and to all the respondents for their participation. Ariful Islam is 
supported by USAID's Emerging Pandemic Threats PREDICT 
program (Cooperative Agreement No.AID-OAA-A-14-00102) 
through EcoHealth Alliance. Mahbubur Rahman is supported by 
the Zoonoses and Emerging Livestock Systems—Associated PhD 
Studentship (ZELS-AS, award reference: 1681346). This program is 
part of the Behavioral adaptations in live poultry trading and farming 
systems and zoonoses control in Bangladesh (BALZAC) project and 
funded by ZELS, a joint research initiative between Biotechnology 
and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), Defense Science 
and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), Department for International 
Development (DFID), Economic and Social Sciences Research 
Council (ESRC), Medical Research Council (MRC), and Natural 
Environment Research Council (NERC). We thank Mohammed 
Ziaur Rahman of the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease 
Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b) for rRT-PCR testing of air sam-
ples. The work was conducted as per general ethical guideline of 
IEDCR, as standard for outbreak investigations, and PhD research of 
Mahbubur Rahman was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) of IEDCR. The views expressed are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily represent the official position of the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention.
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
All the participants provided informed written consent prior to their 
inclusion in the study.
ORCID
Mahbubur Rahman  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8577-8281 
R E FE R E N C E S
 1. World Health Organization for Animal Health. Highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, Bangladesh. http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/publi c/
wahid.php/Disea seinf ormat ion/statu sdetail. Accessed November 
07, 2019.
 2. WHO/GIP. Cumulative number of confirmed human cases for 
avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO, 2003-2019. https ://
www.who.int/influ enza/human_animal_inter face/H5N1_cumul 
ative_table_archi ves/en/. Updated 27 September 2019. Accessed 
November 07, 2019.
 3. Hassan MM, Hoque MA, Debnath NC, Yamage M, Klaassen M. 
Are Poultry or wild birds the main reservoirs for avian influenza in 
Bangladesh? EcoHealth. 2017;14(3):490-500.
 4. Khan SU, Berman L, Haider N, et al. Investigating a crow die-off in 
January–February 2011 during the introduction of a new clade of 
highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 into Bangladesh. Adv 
Virol. 2014;159(3):509-518.
 5. Islam A, Samad MA, Rahman MW, et al.Unusual Crow (Corvus 
Splendens) Die-off In Northwestern Bangladesh: A One Health 
Approach To Outbreak Investigation Paper presented at: One 
Health Eco Health Conference 2016; Melbourne, Australia.
 6. Mase M, Tsukamoto K, Imada T, et al. Characterization of H5N1 
influenza A viruses isolated during the 2003–2004 influenza out-
breaks in Japan. Virology. 2005;332(1):167-176.
 7. Das BR. Isolation and genetic characterization of influenza A 
(Subtype H5N1) virus from crows in India. Adv Anim Vet Sci. 
2014;2(11):620-624.
 8. World Health Organization for Animal Health. Highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, Bangladesh (Immediate notification). http://www.
oie.int/wahis_2/publi c%5C.%5Ctem p%5Crep orts/en_imm_00000 
23531_20170 411_160227.pdf. Published 2017. Accessed July 5, 
2018.
 9. Corzo CA, Allerson M, Gramer M, Morrison RB, Torremorell M. 
Detection of airborne influenza a virus in experimentally infected 
pigs with maternally derived antibodies. Transbound Emerg Dis. 
2014;61(1):28-36.
 10. Zhou JWJ, Zeng X, Huang G, et al. Isolation of H5N6, H7N9 and 
H9N2 avian influenza A viruses from air sampled at live poultry 
markets in China, 2014 and 2015. Euro Surveill. 2016;21(35):30331.
 11. World Health Organization. Recommendations and laboratory proce-
dures for detection of avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in specimens from 
suspected human cases. Geneva: WHO; 2007.
 12. Bertran K, Balzli C, Kwon Y-K, Tumpey TM, Clark A, Swayne 
DE. Airborne transmission of highly pathogenic influenza 
virus during processing of infected poultry. Emerg Infect Dis J. 
2017;23(11):1806-1814.
 13. Bertran K, Clark A, Swayne DE. Mitigation strategies to reduce the 
generation and transmission of airborne highly pathogenic avian in-
fluenza virus particles during processing of infected poultry. Int J 
Hyg Environ Health. 2018;221(6):893-900.
 14. Indriani R, Samaan G, Gultom A, et al. Environmental Sampling for 
Avian Influenza Virus A (H5N1) in Live-Bird Markets, Indonesia. 
Emerg Infect Dis. 2010;16(12):1889-1895.
 15. Barman S, Turner JCM, Hasan MK, et al. Continuing evolution of 
highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses in Bangladeshi live poultry mar-
kets. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2019;8(1):650-661.
How to cite this article: Rahman M, Mangtani P, Uyeki TM, et 
al. Evaluation of potential risk of transmission of avian 
influenza A viruses at live bird markets in response to unusual 
crow die-offs in Bangladesh. Influenza Other Respi Viruses. 
2020;00:1–4. https ://doi.org/10.1111/irv.12716 
